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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Katherine Gibson appeals, challenging the district court's decision to revoke her
probation which she asserts constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. She
also contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for leniency pursuant to
I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion), which was based, in part, on its conclusion that
she had not supported that motion with new or additional information even though she
had filed an addendum with new information several days prior to the district court's
decision.
Ms. Gibson also contends the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to withdraw its
order granting her motion to augment the appellate record with a necessary transcript
after the State filed an untimely objection to her motion violated her constitutional rights
to due process and equal protection. She asserts that the grounds of appeal make out
a colorable need for the inclusion of a transcript of the sentencing hearing held on
September 19, 2007, in the appellate record such that, even under the Idaho Supreme
Court's recent opinion in State v. Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL 6001894 (2013),

reh'g denied, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny her access to the requested
transcript violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a
result, this Court should grant Ms. Gibson access to the requested transcript and allow
her the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of
that transcript.
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district
court's order revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence without
modification, and remand the case so Ms. Gibson may be returned to probation, or

1

alternatively, have her sentence reduced. Alternatively, it should reverse the denial of
her Rule 35 motion and remand for a decision on the merits of that motion. Otherwise,
this Court should reduce Ms. Gibson's sentence as it deems appropriate.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Two cases were filed against Ms. Gibson in early 2007 - one for possession of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia (hereinafter, the possession case), and one
for three counts of forgery (hereinafter, the forgery case). (R., Vol.1, pp.6-7; R., Vol.2,
pp.6-7.) 1 The two cases were consolidated by the district court. (R., Vol.1, pp.33-34;
R., Vol.2, pp.46-47.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Gibson agreed to plead guilty
to the possession of methamphetamine charge and one of the forgery charges, though
she agreed to pay restitution on all charged conduct.

(See R., Vol.1, pp.37-38;

R., Vol.2, pp.50-51; Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.68.) 2

In

exchange, the State agreed to recommend concurrent unified sentences of six years,
with two years fixed, in each case, to be suspended for a period of probation. (See
R., Vol.1, pp.37-38; R., Vol.2, pp.50-51; PSI, p.68.)
Ms. Gibson has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. (PSI, p.80.) She also has
a drug addiction, but was able to complete drug court in 2003. (PSI, pp.11-12, 70, 87;
R., Vol.1, pp.50-51.)

However, Ms. Gibson explained that she had relapsed in her

recovery and had been evicted from her house and had lost custody of her daughter.

Since the clerk's records for these two cases were prepared in independently bound
and paginated volumes, to avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the record prepared for
the possession case (Case No. 41138), and "Vol.2" will refer to the record prepared for
the forgery case (Case No. 41139).
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"GibsonPSI." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached
thereto (police reports, updates to the report, etc.).
1

2

(PSI, p.70.) In that precarious, emotional state, when presented with the opportunity to
accept some forged checks from an acquaintance, she did so. (PSI, p.70.) Later, when
sober, she expressed remorse for her behavior. (PSI, p.70.) The presentence report
recommended that Ms. Gibson participate in the rider program. (PSI, p.83.) However,
the district court decided to impose and suspend concurrent unified sentences of six
years, with two years fixed, for a six-year period of probation (R., Vol.1, pp.54-59;

R., Vol.2, pp.60-63.) 3
Several months later, the Ada County Sherriff's Office sent a letter to the district
court noting that Ms. Gibson had completed several programs while incarcerated with
them, and that she had not violated the rules.

(R., Vol.1, p.77; R., Vol.2, p.80.)

As such, it requested the district court order an early release. (R., Vol.1, p.77; R., Vol.2,
p.80.) The district court denied that request as well. (R., Vol.1, p.77; R., Vol.2, p.80.)
Four years later, in 2012, Ms. Gibson's probation officer, Kelli Gravelle, submitted a
letter to the Court "supporting Ms. Gibson's early discharge from probation." (PSI, p.6;
see Augmentation - Special Progress Report.) Ms. Gavelle reported that there were no

areas of concern regarding Ms. Gibson's performance on probation, and that
Ms. Gibson had fulfilled many of her obligations, such as paying court costs and fines
and completing her community service requirements.

(Augmentation -

Special

Progress Report, p.1.) Ms. Gavelle also reported that Ms. Gibson had passed all her
random urinanalyis tests.

(Augmentation - Special Progress Report, p.2.) She also

documented Ms. Gibson's participation in, and completion of, various treatment
programs. (Augmentation - letters attached to the Special Progress Report.) However,

The minutes for the sentencing hearing held on September 19, 2007, only appear in
Vol.1, even though the minutes indicate both cases were being addressed. (See
R., Vol.1, p.50.)
3
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the State objected to the request for early release based on a not-yet-filed report of
probation violation relating to allegations arising in 2009. (R., Vol.1, pp.78-79; R., Vol.2,
pp.81-82.)

The district court ultimately denied the request for early discharge from

probation. (See PSI, p.6.)
Finally, on April 15, 2013, when Ms. Gibson was five months from completing her
term of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation which addressed the
2009 conduct referred to by the State in its 2012 objection to early discharge, as well as
some allegations relating to admitted use of methamphetamine in April 2013. (R., Vol.1,
pp.95-100; R., Vol.2, pp.97-102.) The report of violation indicated that these issues had
been addressed by imposing intermediate sanctions. (R., Vol.1, p.99; R., Vol.2, p.101.)
As such, the report only recommended that Ms. Gibson be screened for access to
drug court.

(R., Vol.1, p.100; R., Vol.2, p.102.)

The district court rejected that

recommendation based on the fact that Ms. Gibson had participated in the program
some ten years before. (R., Vol.1, p.115.)
Thereafter, Ms. Gibson entered admissions to several of the alleged violations.
(Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.21.)

At that same time, defense counsel requested that

Ms. Gibson's bond be reduced. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-5.) She pointed out that Ms. Gibson
had been accepted into the Ascent intensive outpatient treatment program and, as she
had secured funding in that regard, was eligible to start immediately.

(Tr., p.14,

Ls.20-25.) She would be able to live with her mother under certain conditions set by her
mother (those conditions do not appear in the record).

(Tr., p.14, Ls.13-19.)

Ms. Gibson had steady employment available as well. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-3.) The State's
objection to a bond reduction was premised primarily on the fact that no report of
violation was filed back in 2009 conduct because the State asserted that the 2009
4

conduct was the "most concerning" conduct at issue. 4 (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-9.) The district
court pointed out that Ms. Gibson had already received programming, and asserted that
"[o]bviously it didn't work." (Tr., p.19, L.4 - p.20, L.3.) The district court also decided
that the Ascent program would not provide adequate treatment. (Tr., p.20, Ls.20-23.)
The presentence materials were updated in anticipation of the disposition
hearing. The investigator indicated that Ms. Gibson "seemed much more mature and
was focused on becoming successful in the future. Ms. Gibson offered insight into what
led her to relapse and what she needs to remain substance-abuse free in the future."
(PSI, pp.14-15.) The investigator also noted that, "[a]s opposed to her behavior in 2007,
Ms. Gibson appears to now have the intrinsic motivation and tools to complete a period
of community supervision." (PSI, p.15.) Attached to the updated PSI was a letter of
support from Ms. Gibson's parents, as well as a letter from her employer, which stated
that Ms. Gibson was a valued employee and noted that Ms. Gibson had been working
hard to meet the court's terms for her. 5 (PSI, pp.17-20.) As such, the updated PSI
recommended that Ms. Gibson be released on probation with requirements for
continued participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and the Easter Seals' program.
(PSI, p.15.) The State, suggesting that a period of inpatient treatment could benefit
Ms. Gibson,

recommended

that

the

district

court

retain

jurisdiction

with

a

recommendation that Ms. Gibson participate in the therapeutic community program
during that time. (Tr., p.24, Ls.17-20.)

The record indicates that the prosecutor's office was aware of these allegations at
least as early as July 2012. (See R., pp.78-79.) However, it did not file a motion for
rrobation violation at that time. (See generally R.)
The PSI materials suggest that Ms. Gibson would not be eligible for rehire. (PSI,
p.10.) However, defense counsel represented at the disposition hearing that he had
spoken with Ms. Gibson's employer, who was willing to immediately rehire Ms. Gibson.
(Tr., p.28, Ls.17-23.)
4

5

However, the district court asserted that "it's been my experience that even with
the therapeutic community rider, people come out and they violate."
Ls.11-13.)

(Tr., p.31,

It was also concerned that the Department of Correction would put

Ms. Gibson in the CAPP program instead of the therapeutic community program.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.18-20.) It also considered Ms. Gibson's criminal history, and decided that
neither probation nor a period of retained jurisdiction would suffice. (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-23;
Tr., p.30, Ls.19-20.)

As such, it revoked Ms. Gibson's probation and executed her

sentences, although it did recommend her participation in the prison therapeutic
community program and left open the possibility of her placement at the work center to
help with her reintegration into society. (Tr., p.31, Ls.14-16; Tr., p.33, Ls.2-4; R., Vol.1,
pp.119-22; R., Vol.2, pp.121-23.)
Ms. Gibson filed Notices of Appeal that were timely from the respective orders
revoking probation. (R., Vol.1, pp.133-35; R., Vol.2, pp.135-37.) On June 17, 2013,
Ms. Gibson also filed timely Rule 35 motions in both cases. (R., Vol.1, p.123; R., Vol.2,
p.125.)

On June 18, 2013, defense counsel filed an addendum with additional

information. (R., Vol.1, p.129; R., Vol.2, p.131.) That addendum included a letter from
the New Life residential recovery program, which stated that Ms. Gibson had been
determined to be a likely candidate for their program, though the acceptance process
had not been completed, and a letter from Ms. Gibson's mother recommending
Ms. Gibson's participation in that program. (R., Vol.1, pp.131-32; R., Vol.2, pp.133-34.)
The district court denied the Rule 35 motion on June 26, 2013, partially based on its
assertion that Ms. Gibson had not filed any new information other than "vague
speculations as to some categories of potential information."
R., Vol.2, p.141.)

(R., Vol.1, p.139;

It also reiterated its discussion from the disposition hearing,
6

determining that the sentence was appropriate as executed.

(R., Vol.1, pp.140-41;

R., Vol.2, pp.143-44; compare Tr., p.29, L.10- p.31, L.24.)
On appeal, Ms. Gibson moved to augment the record with the transcripts from
the change of plea hearing held on August 1, 2007, and the sentencing hearing held on
September 19, 2007. 6 (Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof, filed September 24, 2013.) On October 9, 2013, the
Idaho Supreme Court granted that motion. (Order Granting Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated October 9, 2013.) Thereafter, on October 21,
2013, the State objected to the motion to augment.

(See Order, dated October 31,

2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court decided to treat that "untimely objection" as a motion
for reconsideration, which it then granted. (Order, dated October 31, 2013 (emphasis
from original).)

Ms. Gibson is not challenging the denial of her request for the transcript of the entry of
plea hearing held on August 1, 2007, in this appeal.

6
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Gibson due process and equal
protection when it denied her motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Ms. Gibson's
probation, or, alternatively, when it executed her sentence without modification
when it did so.

3.

Whether the district court erred in denying Ms. Gibson's Rule 35 motion for lack
of new evidence.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Gibson Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review
Of The Issues On Appeal
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered a challenge to its decision to deny
a request for augmentation of certain transcripts to the appellate record.

Brunet, _

Idaho _ , 2013 WL 6001894. Its opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review,
which is that, when reviewing decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction,
"this Court conducts an independent review of the entire record available to the trial
court at sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 4 (citing

State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) ). The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that
there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts
sufficient for an adequate appellate review.

See id. at 2-3 (citing Mayer v. City of

Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002)).
That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13.
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."

Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho
at 445. Those same standards have been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho
221, 227 (1998).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established.
9

See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)7; Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971).

Its decisions have established two fundamental themes.

First, the

scope of the due process and equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate
treatment of indigent defendants is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an
adequate record for appellate review, but that record need not include frivolous or
unnecessary materials. See, e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the transcript
requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for its
inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." 8

7

In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ...
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to
support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999);
see also Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in absence of a complete
record). Therefore, if Ms. Gibson fails to provide the appellate court with the transcripts
necessary for review of her claim, this legal presumption will apply and Ms. Gibson's
claims regarding the revocation of probation will not be addressed on their merits. In
effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme Court not affording her access
to relevant transcripts) would deprive her of an effective appeal, making the appeal
8
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Brunet, ___ Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894 at 3; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195 ("where
the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete
transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an
'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds").
The grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the
sentencing hearing held on September 19, 2007.
indicate that Ms. Gibson "makes statement."

The minutes of that hearing only

(R., Vol.1, p.51; R. Vol.2, p.71.)

The

minutes do not reveal the contents of that address. (See generally R., Vol.1, pp.50-51;

R., Vol.2, pp.70-71.)

When a defendant makes a statement of allocution at a

sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the sentencing determination.

See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding that, while
allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right, as
the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested), rev. denied.
Those statements are part of the record before the district court because the
district court is entitled to rely on the knowledge gained from its own official position and
observations, and thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings

constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection grounds.
See
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is "constitutionally invalid ..
. to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") (emphasis added).
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485.
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to
revoke probation because the district court obviously concluded at the sentencing
hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to justify incarcerating
Ms. Gibson, given the objectives of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).
11

in a case.

See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also

State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge
in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial);

State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed
in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved");

State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district
court "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers
all relevant facts in reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App.
1984) (noting that "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already
knew about [the defendant] from the other case").

Since the same district court judge

who revoked Ms. Gibson's probation also presided over the September 19, 2007,
sentencing hearing (compare, e.g., R., Vol.1, p.50, with R., Vol.1, pp.119-21), the
comments made by Ms. Gibson at the September 19, 2007, sentencing hearing are part
of the record that was available to the district court when it subsequently revoked
Ms. Gibson's probation.
Therefore, because her statements impact the decision to revoke probation and
were part of the record before the district court, there is a colorable need for the
transcript of the September 19, 2007, sentencing hearing to be augmented to the
record, so that the appellate court has an adequate record upon which to conduct its
review of the entire record available to the district court when it revoked Ms. Gibson's

12

probation and executed her sentences. 9 See Brunet,_ Idaho_, 2013 WL 6001894

at 3.
As such, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the requested
transcript, and therefore, the Constitution demands that a copy of the September 19,
2007, sentencing hearing be augmented so that Ms. Gibson is afforded an adequate
appellate record.

In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate
Ms. Gibson's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
See, e.g.,
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)).
Appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file
a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set
forth in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides:
9

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on
appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to
revoke probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise
Ms. Gibson on the probable role the transcripts may play in her appeal. Therefore,
Ms. Gibson has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the
merits of her claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in
that endeavor.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Gibson's Probation Or.
Alternatively. When It Executed Her Sentence Without Modification When It Did So

A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Ms. Gibson's Probation
Ms. Gibson asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke

probation and execute her unified sentences of six years, with two years fixed, was an
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within
the district court's discretion.

State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct App. 2000).

The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection
of society." Id. The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether
probation or incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing
I.C. § 19-2521). In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered
inquiry, determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally;
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects

society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.;
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State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of

society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more
lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90

(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco,
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

These same factors are

appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation.

See

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106-07 (2009).

In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Ms. Gibson. As a
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Ms. Gibson's probation was adequately
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Ms. Gibson
through incarceration.

See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.

Therefore, this disposition

constitutes an abuse of discretion.
In fact, the evidence in the record demonstrated that probation was adequately
serving the sentencing objectives. In 2012, Ms. Gibson's probation officer reported to
the district court that Ms. Gibosn's "performance on probation is very satisfactory. At
15

this time, it appears that Ms. Gibson has complied with all Court ordered conditions of
supervision." (Augmentation - Special Progress Report, p.2.) The 2013 update to the
PSI also indicated that Ms. Gibson appeared more mature than before, offering insight
into her addiction and relapse issues. (PSI, pp.14-15.) She was being a productive
member of society, working as an exemplary and valued employee. (PSI, p.20.) As
such, continued probation, or at least a period of retained jurisdiction, should have been
considered to continue Ms. Gibson's rehabilitation. See I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin, 131
Idaho at 648.
The fact that Ms. Gibson struggled some with the terms of her probation in 2009
is less relevant because Ms. Gibson was obviously able to deal with those issues in an
appropriate and constructive manner. (See Augmentation - Special Progress Report.)
That leaves only the 2013 relapse. To that end, the prosecutor was apparently not as
concerned about that relapse, since she argued to the district court that the 2009
conduct was "most concerning" conduct at issue. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-9.) Of course, given
that the prosecutor had been aware of the 2009 conduct for at least a year (see
R., pp.78-79), and had not filed a motion for probation violation based on that

information, the 2009 conduct was not apparently all that concerning to the prosecutor
either.
At any rate, the motion for probation violation and the Special Progress Report
revealed that Ms. Gibson had actually been rather successful in adhering to the terms of
her probation, particularly in the four years between the 2009 allegations and the most
recent relapse. (See Augmentation - Special Progress Report.) The Legislature has
established that, "[t]he court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and
16

circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it
is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public .... "
I.C. § 19-2521(1).

According to Ms. Gibson's probation officer, probation has been

appropriate for the protection of the public for most of that time.
Special Progress Report.)

(Augmentation -

The district court's conclusion to the contrary - that

"[o]bviously it [the prior treatment opportunities] didn't work." (Tr., p.19, L.4 - p.20, L.3)
is clearly erroneous. In addition to the evidence in the Special Progress Report, the
updated PSI also informed the district court that Ms. Gibson was demonstrating growth
and improvement. (PSI, pp.14-15.) Ms. Gibson could not have made such strides in
her own rehabilitation if those programs "didn't work." Therefore, since that conclusion
is not supported by substantial or competent evidence, it should be set aside. See, e.g.

State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007).
The other evidence in the record speaking to Ms. Gibson's character and history
further demonstrates that imprisonment was not necessary to protect the public. For
example, Ms. Gibson had ongoing support from her family.

(Tr., p.14, Ls.13-19; see

also Augmentation - Special Progress Report.) Family constitutes an important part of
a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,
817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's
innocence does not equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation,
implying that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating
factor worthy of consideration).

Ms. Gibson's employer also stated that she was a

valued employee with a good work history. A defendant's reliability and dedication as a
working member of society is a factor which the district courts should consider as part of
the defendant's character.

State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1991 ).
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Her

progress in this regard also demonstrates that she has developed some ability to cope
with the effects of her bipolar disorder, which is important, since she reported that the
forgery case arose because she experienced an episode of depression.

(PSI, p.70.)

Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider
a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.

Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,

581 (1999).
Looking at her prior criminal history, while she had several prior felony charges,
the underlying offenses were the first convictions to remain on her record. 10

(PSI,

pp.70-73) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595,
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by

State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). Therefore, it considered the fact that it
was the defendant's first felony conviction to be a factor in mitigation.

Shideler, 103

Idaho at 595.
Ms. Gibson also indicated that she had a troubled childhood. (PSI, pp.74-75.)
Additionally, she suffered from anorexia and bulimia. (PSI, p.79.) She reported that this
history contributed to her drug addiction. (PSI, p.81.) The court should have sufficiently
considered Ms. Gibson's troubled childhood, which should be weighed against the
offense. See State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). In Williamson,
the Court of Appeals considered the defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a
precursor to the abuse of various narcotic substances and the impact that played on the
offense. Id. Furthermore, Ms. Gibson's growing insight in regard to the issues affecting

10

Ms. Gibson's participation in the drug court program was the result of felony
convictions, but those cases were dismissed when she completed that program. (PSI,
p.70.)
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her addiction is a noteworthy fact which demonstrates her amenability to treatment.
(PSI, pp.14-15.) To that point, Ms. Gibson was still only twenty-nine years old in 2013.
(PSI, p.2.) A younger offender should be treated more leniently because she is still
maturing, and still able to become a productive member of society. See, e.g.,

State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a suspended sentence,
which considers rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and
executes a sentence.

Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the

imposed sentence are still present.

See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15

(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those
objectives).

In addition to restricting her liberty at the discretion of the Board of

Correction and the looming sentence, she would also be deprived of several of her
rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense.
Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute
the original sentence if Ms. Gibson were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation.
However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed.
What the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the
opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Ms. Gibson to apply the
lessons she would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting. This is why the
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updated PSI recommended that Ms. Gibson be returned to probation with the additional
requirement that she complete the Easter Seals program. (See PSI, p.15.)
The State also recognized that continued rehabilitation was still possible, but
suggested a different program - the therapeutic community rider program. (Tr., p.24,
Ls.17-20.)

A period of retained jurisdiction would also sufficiently address the

sentencing objectives in this case. It would punish Ms. Gibson by depriving her of her
liberty during the period of retained jurisdiction.

That, combined with the imposed

sentence would also serve as a deterrent to society at large. Society would also receive
equally similar protection by retaining jurisdiction as it would by incarcerating her. Such
a disposition would also deter Ms. Gibson specifically because the sentence need not
be suspended should she perform poorly or otherwise violate the terms of the rider.
And if the district court did that, the parole board would have broad discretion over
whether to release her on parole during the indeterminate term of her sentence. See,

e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005).

However, the district court could

relinquish jurisdiction and enforce the prison sentence knowing that all the sentencing
objectives were properly addressed.
What both of these alternatives afford is the opportunity for Ms. Gibson to
continue to rehabilitate in a timely fashion. The Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals have realized that timing is an important consideration when addressing
rehabilitation.

See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other

grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,
91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App.
1988).
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The district court's reason for not retaining jurisdiction was: "it's been my
experience that even with the therapeutic community rider, people come out and they
violate."

(Tr., p.31, Ls.11-13.)

To say that Ms. Gibson should not be afforded the

opportunity to participate in that program because other people have not made the most
of a similar opportunity fails to adhere to the requirement that the district court
make individualized

sentencing

determinations.

See,

e.g.,

I.C.

§

19-2521(1);

State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 610-11 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Pederson,
124 Idaho 179, 183 (Ct. App. 1993)). Therefore, the district court's decision to revoke
Ms. Gibson's probation, particularly without even retaining jurisdiction when it did so,
constitutes an abuse of its sentencing discretion.

111.
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Gibson's Rule 35 Motion For Lack Of New
Evidence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.

State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

When petitioning for a sentence

reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. "The criteria
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were
altered by the new evidence Ms. Gibson presented.
21

See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at

203. A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See e.g., Cook, 145
Idaho at 489-90; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595.
As a preliminary matter, the district court erroneously concluded that "[bJecause
[Ms.] Gibson presented no evidence in support of her motion and, other than vague
speculation as to some categories of potential information, failed to advise the Court of
any 'then-unavailable evidence which would be forthcoming ... the Court denies her
motion for more time and for an evidentiary hearing." (R., Vol.1, p.139; R., Vol.2, p.141
(emphasis added).)

That is a clearly erroneous conclusion because Ms. Gibson

provided a letter from Maria McConnell, written on June 17, 2013, which informed the
district court that her application to the New Life program had been received and she
was considered a "likely candidate" for the program. (R., Vol.1, p.131; R., Vol.2, p.133.)
Since that letter was not written until after the district court revoked Ms. Gibson's
probation (see R., Vol.1, p.121 (order revoking probation file stamped June 7, 2013)), it
obviously constitutes new and additional information unavailable to the district court at
the disposition hearing. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that Ms. Gibson had
failed to support her motion with new or additional information is clearly erroneous.
That error permeates all the district court's decisions in regard to the Rule 35
motion - whether a hearing was necessary, whether to grant the motion, and so forth.
For example, the district court's discussion as to why it felt the sentence was
appropriate was essentially the same as its rationale for revoking probation in the
first place. (Compare R., Vol.1, pp.140-42, and R., Vol.2, pp.142-44, with Tr., p.29,
L.10 - p.31, L.24.) Therefore, since those factors were impacted by the new evidence,
the district court's rationale does not justify denying the Rule 35 motion, since the
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district court is required to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in
light of the mitigating factors as they were altered by the new information presented.
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203; Trent, 125 Idaho at 253. Therefore, the order denying the
Rule 35 motion should be vacated and this case remanded for further proceedings in
that regard.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Gibson respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Gibson respectfully
requests that this Court order her be returned to probation, or alternatively, reduce her
sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, it should reverse the denial of her Rule
35 motion and remand for a decision on the merits of that motion. Otherwise, this Court
should reduce Ms. Gibson's sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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